Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2

Article 2

2001

Low-Life-Sleazy-Big-Haired-Trailer-Park Girl v. The
President: the Paula Jones Case and the Law Of
Sexual Harassment
Barbara Palmer
Judith Baer
Amy Jasperson
Jacqueline DeLaat

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Sexuality and the Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Palmer, Barbara, et al. "Low-Life-Sleazy-Big-Haired-Trailer-Park Girl v. The President: the Paula Jones Case and the Law Of Sexual
Harassment." American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 9, no. 2 (2001): 283-304.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Palmer et al.: Low-Life-Sleazy-Big-Haired-Trailer-Park Girl v. The President: th
PALMER.FINALMACRO_ASC VERSION 02

9/8/01 7:17 PM
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PRESIDENT: THE PAULA JONES CASE
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JACQUELINE DELAAT*****
“Paula Jones got a new hairstyle. Did you see it? She
looks pretty good. I’ll tell you, she looks pretty good.
In fact, today even her lawyer said, ‘Now you only
need four drinks to hit on her’”
- Jay Leno, The Tonight Show.
“Paula Jones is now upset because she is being audited
by the IRS, and she claims the only reason that she is
being audited is because of this lawsuit she has against
the President. I don’t know, you figure it out . . .
Anytime you write off $20,000 for hair spray, you’re
going to get audited”
- David Letterman, The Late Show.

I. INTRODUCTION
On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones made history by filing the first
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sexual harassment suit against a sitting President of the United
States.1 Her case not only raised legal questions about sexdiscrimination, but also broached the issue of whether a sitting
President could be subject to a civil suit,2 and lead to the Monica
Lewinsky scandal and ultimately the impeachment hearings of
President Clinton.3 Although Jones obviously received a great deal of
media coverage, very little has been written by scholars on the
particular legal ramifications of her sexual harassment case, perhaps
suggesting that this case really meant nothing in terms of the
development of sex-discrimination law. The media coverage of her
sexual harassment case also led many to the conclusion that this was,
in fact, a rather cut and dry legal question: Paula Jones’ allegations
were not believable and did not constitute sexual harassment.4 The
purpose of this Article is to suggest that there are, in fact, reasons to
believe Jones’ account, and that significant questions of law regarding
both her quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims could have been decided either way. In addition,
this case particularly highlights the role of power differences in
sexual harassment. Finally, the appropriateness of dismissal through
summary judgment is also open to question. Judge Susan Weber
Wright’s opinion is problematic in that elements of her reasoning
1. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 662 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (discussing the procedural
history of Paula Jones’ lawsuit against President Clinton).
2. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (holding that there is no constitutional
provision protecting a sitting President from being the subject of a lawsuit).
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 1 (1998) (impeaching President Clinton for high crimes
and misdemeanors as a result of “perjurious, false and misleading testimony before a federal
grand jury” in the Paula Jones case regarding the sexual nature of his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky).
4. See William A. Henry, III, How to Report the Lewd and Unproven, TIME, Sept. 16, 1994, at
46 (commenting that the Jones case made media editors wary because they were fearful that she
was only seeking money and publicity, as well as the fact that she had connections to “people
hoping for political gain”); Innocent Victim or Big Liar of the Week, TIME, Sept. 16, 1994, at 31
(noting that many stories about Paula Jones attacked her character and portrayed her as a
“promiscuous” liar); Pundit Apologizes for Remarks about Clinton Accuser, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May
23, 1994, at A1 (commenting that Evan Thomas, NEWSWEEK’s Washington Bureau Chief, had
to apologize after publicly stating that Jones “was sleazy and had big hair and came from a
trailer park,”); see also LARRY SABATO & ROBERT LICHTER, WHEN SHOULD THE WATCHDOGS BARK:
MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE CLINTON SCANDALS 40 (1994) (commenting that reporters were
reluctant to “report the most ‘legitimate’ angle of the Paula Jones story—on the job sexual
harassment of a low level employee by a powerful boss . . .”); Lynn Rosellini & Greg Ferguson,
The Woman Who Sued Bill Clinton, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 13, 1994, at 42 (commenting
on Jones’ portrayal in the media as a “white trash bimbo”); David Stout, Clinton’s Lawyers Say a
Fund for Paula Jones is Being Misused, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at 31 (remarking that many
Clinton supporters perceived Paula Jones’ lawsuit as a conservative-backed effort to destroy
President Clinton). Cf. Nancy R. Hauserman, Comparing Conversations About Sexual Harassment in
the United States and Sweden: Print Media Coverage of the Case Against Astra USA, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S
L.J. 45, 47 (1999) (comparing the influence of the media on public perceptions in Sweden and
the United States regarding sexual harassment).
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conflict with Supreme Court precedent and are a step backward in
the development of sexual harassment law.5
An analysis of the Jones case is important because it was part of a
larger legal battle involving the President. The controversies
surrounding her claims reveal not only contradictions in the law of
sexual harassment,6 but also tensions in the relationship between
courts and the media,7 and public perceptions of women who file
5. Ironically, Judge Wright has herself acknowledged the ambiguities and contradictions
in the law. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 742, 787 (1998) (holding that pervasive
and severe sexual harassment altering the conditions of the workplace constitutes a violation of
Title VII); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280 (1998) (holding that school
districts can only be held liable under Title IX if there was knowledge of offending conduct by a
teacher against a student, and action was not taken); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 763 (1998) (holding that a tangible sexual harassment action in the workplace by a
superior becomes the act of the employer under Title VII); Susan Weber Wright, Uncertainties in
the Law of Sexual Harassment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 11, 12 (1999) (focusing on issues of vicarious
liability and the potential conflicts between these Faragher, Gebser, and Burlington Industries, Inc.,
each handed down by the Supreme Court at the end of the 1998 Term).
6. See, e.g., Hillary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of
Heterosexual “Horseplay:” Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of
the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 208-09 (1999)
(analyzing the contradictory nature of the Supreme Court’s holding in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), which allows claimants to challenge same-sex sexual
harassment under Title VII, but also reflects “constrained conceptions of sex”); Dawn D.
Bennett-Alexander, Lower Court Interpretation of the Meritor Decision: Putting Flesh on the Supreme
Court’s Sexual Harassment Skeleton, 6 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 85 (1991) (“The Court did not
provide sufficient guidelines for lower courts to determine when a hostile environment is
present and what activity would indicate that the defendant’s conduct towards plaintiff is
unwelcome.”); Stephen Buehrer, A Clash of the Titans: Judicial Deference to Arbitration and the
Public Policy Exception in the Context of Sexual Harassment, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 265,
267 (1998) (discussing the conflicting doctrines in the area of sexual harassment law, which
often results in employer confusion regarding an appropriate response to allegations of sexual
harassment); Francis Carleton, Women in the Workplace and Sex Discrimination Law: A Feminist
Analysis of Federal Jurisprudence, 13 WOMEN & POLITICS 1, 8 (1993) (commenting on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), which revealed
contradictions in sexual harassment law because while the Court held that sexual harassment
may occur without a tangible economic impact, it must exceed a “certain subjective level of
severity” before it is actionable under Title VII); Lynn T. Dickerson, Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment: A New Standard, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 107, 116-17 (1995) (noting that
although the Supreme Court has held that a tangible economic harm is not necessary to a
hostile environment claim, the Court has not yet addressed whether such economic harm must
be shown in a quid pro quo sexual harassment case); Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women’s
Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 50-51 (1990) (discussing that even with
the advent of Meritor there are contradictory conclusions regarding the application of the
hostile work environment theory in sexual harassment claims).
7. See generally RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS & IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS
(1994). Davis discusses his experience as a journalist assigned to the Supreme Court and the
love-hate relationship between the media and the justices that sit on the nation’s highest court.
Id. See Charles Franklin & Liane Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the Supreme
Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 352-53 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (commenting that the
public lacks general knowledge of Supreme Court decisions due to the low level of media
attention to the Court’s holdings); THOMAS MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 143 (1989) (arguing that few reporters are well trained enough to cover judicial
decision making resulting in poor press coverage, particularly in reference to Supreme Court
cases, which also influences the public’s perception of the Court); ELLIOT E. SLOTNICK &
JENNIFER A. SEGAL, TELEVISION NEWS AND THE SUPREME COURT 5-6 (commenting that the
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sexual harassment claims.8 Perhaps most astonishing is that a sexual
harassment case filed by a woman from Arkansas led to impeachment
proceedings against the President of the United States. While
President Clinton ultimately escaped removal, many thought he
would be the first President to be indicted after leaving office.9
Moreover, much of Clinton’s continued public support, which many
argue prevented him from being removed from office, came from
women.10 Consequently, the Jones case is worthy of our attention.
Supreme Court’s legitimacy is based primarily on the public’s perception of it, which is
transmitted through the mass media); see also Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice
and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1539 (1996) (“The segment of the public
that does follow the work of the Court often cares intensely how the Court is covered and
monitors journalism about the Court very closely, in recognition that today’s journalism . . . is in
many respects tomorrow’s history of the Court.”). See generally William Mischler & Reginald S.
Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on
Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 88 (1993) (noting the effect of public
perception on Supreme Court decisions); John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Public Perception of
the Supreme Court in the 1990s, 82 JUDICATURE 66, 67 (1998) (referencing a survey conducted in
1997 that provided a public rating of the Supreme Court).
8. See Christina E. Wells, Hypocrites and Barking Harlots: The Clinton-Lewinsky Affair and the
Attack on Women, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 151, 154-56 (1998) (comparing the public’s
perception of Anita Hill and Justice Thomas’ confirmation hearings to that of the relationship
between Monica Lewinsky and President Clinton).
9. See Judy Keen, New Grand Jury Empanelled: Democrats Call Timing “Calculated,” USA
TODAY, Aug. 18, 2000, at 4A (noting that independent counsel Robert Ray, who took over from
Kenneth Starr in October of 1999, “has always left open the possibility that he would seek
criminal charges against Clinton for perjury and obstruction of justice – stemming from the
President’s denial of an affair with [Monica] Lewinsky in his testimony in Paula Jones’ sexual
harassment lawsuit.”). Keen also explains that many Democrats viewed the timing of this
decision calculated because Ray announced it hours before Democratic candidate for the 43rd
President, Al Gore, was to give his nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic National
Convention. Id. On his last day in office, Clinton signed a deal with Ray, in which he admitted
to giving false testimony during the Jones deposition, paid a $25,000 fine, and surrendered his
law license for five years. In exchange Ray dropped his investigation. See Judy Keen, Deal Brings
an End to Scandal Investigation; Clinton’s Law License Suspended for 5 Years, USA TODAY, Jan. 22,
2001, at 8A.
10. Public opinion polls consistently showed a general lack of support for Jones and her
claims. A majority of both men and women did not believe that her accusations were true.
Gallup poll results from 1995 indicate that only 27% of respondents believed that Jones’ story
was more true than false. See David Moore, Paula Jones Gains Credibility, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY,
June 1997, at 6. Two years later, of those who had heard of Jones, 40% had a negative view of
her and only 12% had a favorable view of her. See Paula Jones Faces an Uphill Battle Against
Clinton, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1997, at A1. There were, however, measurable differences in
attitudes between men and women regarding her story. Women were far more harsh in their
evaluations of Jones than men. See David Moore, Americans Back Dismissal of Paula Jones’ Lawsuit,
GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Apr. 1998, at 15 (noting that “although the Jones case involved
allegations of sexual harassment, an issue that normally concerns women more than men, such
is not the case here,” with 6% more women than men agreeing it was fair to Jones to throw out
her case). Women were also far more likely to support Clinton. Fewer women (29%) than men
(40%) felt that the Jones case was relevant for judging Clinton’s performance as President. See
id. In the 1996 election, there were significant differences between men and women in their
votes for President, with 54% of women voting for Clinton as opposed to 43% of men, and 38%
of women voting for Dole as opposed to 44% of men. See CENTER FOR THE AMERICAN WOMAN
AND POLITICS, THE GENDER GAP: VOTING CHOICES, PARTY IDENTIFICATION, AND PRESIDENTIAL
PERFORMANCE RATINGS 1 (1997). In addition, much of Clinton’s support during the
impeachment hearings came overwhelmingly from women. A poll taken just before the
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II. THE “FACTS”
Paula Jones’ claim was based on events that occurred in a hotel
room in May of 1991 in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the way she was
subsequently treated at her job as a state employee while Clinton was
11
According to the facts provided in the
Governor of Arkansas.
federal district court opinion, Jones was working the registration desk
for an event at a hotel in Little Rock where Clinton was scheduled to
deliver a speech.12
Through one of his bodyguards, Clinton
communicated to Jones that he wanted to meet her because she had
“that come-hither look . . . a sort of [sexually] suggestive
appearance.”13 Jones was then invited to meet Clinton in his hotel
room.14 Jones testified that she thought it was an honor to meet the
Governor and that the meeting might lead to an enhanced
employment opportunity.15 After Jones arrived at the hotel room,
they made “small talk” about her job, and Clinton told her that her
supervisor, Dave Harrington, was a “good friend” of his.16 At that
point, Clinton attempted to kiss Jones and began sliding his hand up
her thigh.17 Upset and confused, Jones said she walked away from
Clinton and went over to sit down on “the end of the sofa nearest the
door.”18 He sat down next to her, unzipped his pants, and asked her
to kiss his erect penis.19 Jones then “‘jumped up from the couch’”
and told the Governor that she “had to go.”20 As she was leaving,
Clinton said, “If you get in trouble for leaving work, have Dave call
me immediately and I’ll take care of it. . . . You are smart. Let’s keep
this between ourselves.”21 Jones testified that she “understood that he
Senate’s impeachment vote in February of 1999, revealed that 38% of men thought that Clinton
should have been convicted and removed, while only 25% of women did. See Frank Newport,
Gender Gap Persists for Clinton, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 12, 1999, available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990212b.asp.
11. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 662-66 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (recounting the basic
facts that led up to Paula Jones’ sexual harassment claim).
12. Id. at 663.
13. Id. (quoting Clinton’s bodyguard, Danny Ferguson, who had been told by Clinton that
if Jones wanted to meet him, she could “come up”).
14. Id.
15. Id. (noting that when Jones asked Ferguson why the Governor wanted to see her, he
replied, “we do this all the time”).
16. Id.
17. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664 (commenting on Jones’ testimony that Clinton’s advances
were unwelcome and that she resisted advances although she was “stunned and intimidated by
them and intimidated by who he was”).
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was telling her that he had control over Mr. Harrington and over her
job, and that he was willing to use that power,” and that filing a
complaint might jeopardize her career.22
After this incident, Jones stated that she was “in constant fear” of
retaliation, and that her supervisors at work began treating her “very
rudely.”23 When she came back from maternity leave, she was
transferred to a position with less responsibility and often had no
work to do.24 She claimed that several times she informed her
immediate supervisor of her interest in other jobs that had higher
pay and more responsibility, but was told not to bother applying.25
Jones also describes several encounters with Clinton and his
bodyguard after the incident at the hotel. One of her job
responsibilities was to deliver items to the Governor’s office. The first
time she ran into Clinton’s bodyguard, he told her that Clinton
wanted her phone number. Jones refused to give it to him.26 On
another occasion, Clinton “draped his arm over her, pulled her close
to him and held her tightly to his body, and said to his bodyguard,
‘Don’t we make a beautiful couple: Beauty and the Beast?’”27
Three years after the incident in the hotel, an article in the
American Spectator reported that Jones had actually engaged in sexual
relations with Clinton.28 In a press conference, Jones demanded that
Clinton acknowledge the article, explain that she had denied his
advances, and apologize to her.29 A Clinton spokesperson delivered a
letter from Clinton to Jones stating that he had never met her and
the incident never occurred.30
Jones subsequently filed her sexual harassment claim against
Clinton, who was by this time President of the United States.31 Jones
filed both quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims.32 In
22. Id. (commenting on Paula Jones’ statements that since that moment in the hotel room
she became “very fearful” about having refused to submit to Clinton’s advances).
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 665.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

28. Id. at 666 (observing that this report was published after Jones had terminated her
employment in Arkansas and moved to California with her husband).
29. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 666.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jones actually filed her case under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and not Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because the statute of limitations had run. See Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 668
(suggesting that Judge Wright nevertheless used the legal tests under Title VII to evaluate
Jones’ claims).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss2/2

6

Palmer et al.: Low-Life-Sleazy-Big-Haired-Trailer-Park Girl v. The President: th
PALMER.FINALMACRO_ASC VERSION 02

2001]

THE PAULA JONES CASE

9/8/01 7:17 PM

289

April of 1998, Judge Wright granted the President’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the case.33
Ultimately, we do not know what actually occurred between Paula
Jones and Bill Clinton. Because the trial judge dismissed the case,
the parties never publicly presented evidence about the truth or
mendacity of the allegations.34 Therefore, we have no way of knowing
what happened at the Excelsior Hotel on May 8, 1991, or what Jones’
supervisors did to her in the intervening twenty-one months until she
quit her job. Moreover, there is reason to question the credibility of
both parties to the case. The plaintiff was sponsored by groups, such
as the Rutherford Institute, that had a clear ideological agenda.35
President Clinton was held in contempt for lying during the
deposition about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky,36 making
Jones’ story easier to believe. This does not, however, provide the
kind of evidence needed in a court case. These are the kinds of
litigants who frustrate and confound juries and judges. Whose
tainted story do we believe?
Immediately after the incident in Clinton’s suite, Jones told Pamela
Blackard, the other woman who was working at the registration desk,
what had happened.37 In her deposition, Blackard stated that when
Jones came back from Clinton’s room, she was “shaking and
embarrassed.”38 A few days later, Jones also told two friends and her
sister, who said that Jones was “bawling . . . and appeared scared,
embarrassed, and ashamed.”39 One of her friends encouraged Jones
to formally report the incident to her boss, but Jones pointed out that
33. Id. at 679.
34. Id. at 678. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Imagined Pasts: Sexualized Violence and the
Revision of the Truth, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 155 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (“Lawsuits are not
just about the determination of the law; they are also crucially authoritative determinations of
‘what happened.’”).
35. See Stout, supra note 4, at 31 (noting that the Rutherford Institute, a conservative group
of “Clinton haters,” took part in fund raising activities benefiting Jones and her lawsuit against
President Clinton).
36. See Robert Suro, Clinton is Sanctioned in Jones Lawsuit; Payment Ordered to Lawyers, Court,
WASH. POST, July 30, 1999, at A1 (noting that after Judge Wright dismissed Jones’ sexual
harassment case, she fined President Clinton over $90,000 for giving “false, misleading and
evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process” during deposition
questioning). Clinton paid the fine, making him the first sitting President to ever be found in
contempt of court. Id. As a result of Judge Wright’s contempt charge, the bar committee
created by the Arkansas State Supreme Court recommended revoking Clinton’s license to
practice law. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton is Angry and Dispirited Over Disbarment Fight, Friends Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at 22 (commenting that the disbarment trial will occur before
Clinton leaves office).
37. See Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664 (citing Blackard’s comments from her deposition noting
that Jones was very upset when she recounted the alleged incident with Clinton).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 665.
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“her boss was friends with the Governor,” and what Clinton had said
and done had made her afraid to say anything.40
Many victims of sexual harassment do not tell their supervisors or
file formal complaints, because, like Jones, they are afraid of
retaliation.41 Others do not file complaints because they think they
did something to bring on the harassment or they fear they will not
be believed.42 It is quite common for victims to simply not tell anyone
about their experiences.43 However, if they later on decide to file a
complaint, their initial silence is often used to attack their
credibility.44 This attack cannot be made against Jones. The factual
record makes it clear that Jones did one thing that distinguishes her
allegations from the sexual harassment claims of many other women:
she told somebody about it.45 Consequently, there are strong reasons
to believe her account of the events.
III. THE LEGAL QUESTIONS
Regardless of whether one believes Jones’ story or not, if we take
her allegations at face value, the question still remains: do her
allegations constitute sexual harassment?
The law generally
recognizes two forms of sexual harassment, quid pro quo and hostile

40. See id.
41. See Kathleen McKinney & Nick Maroules, Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL COERCION 29,
37 (Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary Koralewski eds., 1991) (setting forth a summary of studies
which found that most incidents of sexual harassment in academia are not reported); Pamela
Hewitt Loy & Lea P. Stewart, The Extent and Effect of the Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 17
SOC. FOCUS 31, 41 (1984) (discussing the results of a telephone survey that found that 62.3% of
the harassed individuals sampled reported “negative organizational outcomes” of which 26%
involved “lower work evaluations or denial of promotions”); Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in
Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 497, 498 (1991) (citing a 1982
survey of federal employees that showed only 11% of employees reported incidents of
harassment to supervisory authorities).
42. See Riger, supra note 41, at 502 (discussing how perceptions of normal sexual relations
of men lead many women to interpret incidents of sexual harassment as commonplace and
normative).
43. See id. at 501 (summarizing how the outcomes in informal proceedings, which often do
not punish the harasser, discourage victims of sexual harassment from bringing a complaint).
44. Many women are not believed when they take their claims into the legal arena or make
them public. See, e.g., TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES, CLARENCE
THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION 332-77 (1992) (noting
that Anita Hill’s allegations against Clarence Thomas were not taken seriously by either
Democrats or Republicans in the Senate, until she revealed that she had told three of her
friends about Thomas’ harassment); Emma Coleman Jordan, Race, Gender, and Social Class in the
Thomas Sexual Harassment Hearings: The Hidden Fault Lines in Political Discourse, 15 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1992) (explaining that the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings
resembled a “credibility contest” and 55% of respondents believed Hill was lying two days into
the hearings).
45. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 664-65 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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work environment.46 Jones filed both claims against Clinton.47
A. The Quid Pro Quo Claim
In evaluating the quid pro quo claim, Judge Wright adopted a
standard requiring Jones to show that “her refusal to submit to
unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors resulted in
tangible job detriment.”48 Jones argued that she was discouraged
from applying for jobs with higher pay and was transferred to a
position with fewer responsibilities and less potential for
advancement.49 Judge Wright, however, noted that during the two
years after the incident at the hotel, Jones received “every merit
increase and cost-of-living allowance for which she was eligible . . .
and consistently received satisfactory job evaluations . . . and her
position was reclassified from Grade 9 to Grade 11.”50 Consequently,
Jones did not suffer “tangible job detriment” and could not show
quid pro quo harassment.51 Arguably, under this standard, the
promotions and salary increases that Jones received effectively
refuted her quid pro quo claim, largely because Jones offered no
convincing evidence that she would have been treated better if the
incident had never happened.52
Jones also averred that concrete evidence of tangible job detriment
was not required, rather mere threats would be enough.53 Judge
Wright rejected this argument, stating that “a showing of a tangible
job detriment or adverse employment action is an essential element
of . . . [a] quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.”54 Furthermore, the
Judge maintained that Clinton’s statements to her did “not in any way
constitute a clear threat that clearly conditions concrete job benefits
or detriments on compliance with sexual demands,” since Jones was
only “read[ing] between the lines” when Clinton said her boss was a

46. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION 32 (1979) (explaining how two forms of sexual harassment exist and that
each requires the application of different legal standards).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 666.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 672.
Id.

52. Id. at 670 (discussing how Jones argued that “a showing of tangible job detriment is not
an essential element of an action for quid pro quo harassment,” but she also “acknowledge[d]
that no one . . . ever told her that if she refused to submit to his alleged advances it would have
a negative effect on her job . . . .”).
53. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 669.
54. Id. at 674.
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good friend.55
Three months after the Jones case was dismissed, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth,56 holding that “an employee who refuses the unwelcome and
threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse,
tangible job consequences” could still prevail on a sexual harassment
claim.57 In that case, Kimberly Ellerth was subjected to numerous
remarks and gestures by one of her supervisors over a fifteen month
period. On one occasion, for example, her supervisor made a
comment about her breasts, and when she did not respond, he said,
“I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington.”58 She
was never specifically told that she would suffer retaliation if she did
not submit to his advances. In fact, she even received a promotion.
Although the Supreme Court focused on the issue of the vicarious
liability of the employer, it made it clear that even threats that were
not carried out would constitute sex discrimination, provided the
conduct was “severe or pervasive.”59
Although Ellerth was not controlling in the Jones case, the question
of whether Jones could have prevailed under this standard can still be
explored. Jones’ case appears to be less clear than Ellerth’s. Judge
Wright’s analysis focused on the single comment made by Clinton
that Jones’ supervisor was his good friend.60 Judge Wright discounted
this statement as merely an implied threat.61 Jones, however, clearly
did not interpret this comment in the way that Wright did. Judge
Wright also did not give any weight to Clinton’s remark to Jones as
she left the room: “You’re smart. Let’s keep this between ourselves.”62
This statement can be construed as a much more overt threat. In this
part of her analysis, Judge Wright completely ignored Jones’ assertion
that Clinton exposed himself to her. If making comments regarding
a woman’s breasts creates an actionable claim, as they did in Ellerth,
surely the physical act of exposing one’s penis does as well. What is
clear from Ellerth is that the Supreme Court disagreed with Judge

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 670-71.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Id. at 747.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 754.
Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 670.

61. Id. It should be noted that in Ellerth, the Supreme Court specifically stated that, “we
express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
62. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664.
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Wright’s general assertion that threats are not enough.63 Thus, it is
conceivable that under the standard articulated in Ellerth, Jones
would have at least an arguable quid pro quo claim.64
B. The Hostile Work Environment Claim
Perhaps even murkier is Judge Wright’s opinion regarding Jones’
hostile work environment claim. Judge Wright reasoned, based on
65
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, that a plaintiff must show that “she
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment based upon her sex
that affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment . . . [and
the] harassment must also be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment.’”66 With regards to Jones’ claim against Clinton, Judge
Wright concluded that Clinton’s behavior at the hotel room, while “if
true, was certainly boorish and offensive,” did not create a hostile
work environment.67
In assessing whether harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive, “a court must look to the totality of the circumstances,”
which includes the frequency of harassment, the use of physical
threats and interference with work performance.68 In her analysis of
the totality of circumstances, Judge Wright noted that Jones “never
missed a day of work, . . . continued to go on a daily basis to the
Governor’s office to deliver items, . . . never filed a complaint, . . .
never consulted a psychiatrist . . . or incurred medical bills as a result
of the alleged incident.”69 Thus, according to Judge Wright, the
incident in the hotel and Jones’ subsequent encounters with Clinton
and his bodyguard were not severe or pervasive enough to create an
63. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 834 (1991) (arguing that the
requisite showing of both “an actual threat” and “that [the plaintiff’s] reaction to the threat,
rather than some other factor, resulting in her firing or demotion” is too narrow and often
results in courts finding that legitimate complaints do not “establish the requisite nexus”).
64. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (indicating that unfulfilled threats would now be considered
as part of a hostile work environment claim, rather than a quid pro quo claim). Arguably, while
Ellerth could make Jones’ quid pro quo claim weaker, it could make her hostile work
environment claim stronger.
65. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
66. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 674 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986))
(discussing that Jones also filed a hostile work environment claim against her supervisors and
there was little evidence to support such an allegation). Her list of complaints against her
supervisors included: “moving her work location, refusing to give her meaningful work,
watching her constantly, and failing to give her flowers on Secretary’s Day in 1992, even though
all the other women in the office received flowers.” Id. at 665.
67. Id. at 675.
68. Id. at 674.
69. Id. at 675.
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abusive work environment.70
Conceivably, Jones’ incidental encounters with Clinton and his
bodyguard in and of themselves may not have created a work
environment that was sufficiently hostile to win a sexual harassment
claim. However, it is interesting to note the factors Judge Wright
considered in her totality of the circumstances analysis. By her
standard, women must consult a psychiatrist or become so upset as to
make themselves sick and in need of a doctor’s care for their
experiences to be considered sexual harassment.71 This seems to
conflict with the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Harris v. Forklift
Systems,72 which was binding when Judge Wright decided Jones’ case.
Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, in Harris stated
“Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown.”73 The Court held that “[t]o be actionable as
‘abusive work environment’ harassment, conduct need not ‘seriously
affect [an employee’s] psychological well being’ or lead the plaintiff
to ‘suffe[r] injury.’”74 Consequently, Wright’s analysis of the totality
of the circumstances appears to rely on a standard that the Supreme
Court found inappropriate.
There is another problematic aspect of Judge Wright’s hostile work
environment analysis. Lower courts have recognized that a single
incident of sexual harassment can constitute a legally valid claim,75
and much of Judge Wright’s analysis of Jones’ hostile work
environment claim focuses on the incident in the hotel room. Judge
Wright argued, however, that Jones’ alleged experience in the hotel
room was “not one of those exceptional cases in which a single
incident of sexual harassment, such as an assault, [can be] deemed
sufficient to state a claim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment.”76 This reasoning suggests that unless a woman actually
endures a physical assault, a single incident is more than likely not
going to be sufficient to create a hostile work environment. Judge
Wright relied primarily on Crisonino v. New York City Housing
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 17.

75. See Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, “Jones v. Clinton:” An Emerging Trend in Title
VII Law, 1998 N.Y. L.J. 3 (stating that while many courts have acknowledged that a single severe
episode of harassment can be the basis of a hostile work environment claim, Judge Wright cited
that a single episode of harassment that does not involve an assault cannot be severe enough to
constitute a valid hostile work environment claim).
76. Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 675 (emphasis added).
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Authority77 to support this conclusion. In that case, Elizabeth
Crisonino had been fired from her job with the Housing Authority
after an incident with her boss, in which he called her a “dumb bitch”
and “shoved her so hard that she fell backward and hit the floor,
sustaining injuries from which she has yet to fully recover.”78 The
opinion, which upheld Crisonino’s Title VII claim, did not expressly
state whether or not a hostile work environment claim could be
sustained absent a sexual assault.79 Judge Wright’s opinion, however,
appears to do just that.
In evaluating cases involving a single incident, Crisonino’s case was
recognized by the court as serious enough to constitute sexual
harassment.80 On the other end of the spectrum, in Lam v. Curators of
the University of Missouri,81 a federal court ruled that a single exposure
to an offensive instructional videotape “containing sexual
innuendoes” did not establish a cause of action.82 Where on this
continuum does Clinton’s alleged behavior fall? In the absence of
congressional or administrative guidance, Judge Wright was free to
make that decision. Jones’ allegations presented Judge Wright with
the classic situation described long ago by Benjamin Cardozo, “where
the colors do not match, when the references in the index fail, where
there is no decisive precedent, [and] the serious business of judging
begins.”83 What Jones experienced in the hotel room clearly fell short
of the kind of insult to her body that Crisonino suffered. On the
other hand, an erect penis on a video tape does not have the same
impact as one attached to a man who tells you to kiss it.
One possible test to determine if a single incident constitutes
sexual harassment might be whether the alleged behavior constitutes
a criminal act under the law of that jurisdiction. By this test,
Crisonino and Jones could establish a case, respectively, for assault (a

77. 985 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (recounting that a former employee’s allegations
may be sufficient to support the finding that she was a victim of gender motivated crime for
purposes of GMVA).
78. Id. at 388.
79. Id. at 390 (stating that “stray remarks” can suffice to establish a prima facie case under
some circumstances).
80. Id. at 393.
81. 122 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1997).
82. Id. at 655 (stating that an allegedly offensive videotape did not create a pervasive
hostile environment).
83. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21 (1921) (describing the
encroachment of subjective standards into the judicial decision making process); see also JUDITH
BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 32 (1999)
(explaining that under subjective standards one person may not feel harassed while another
person will).
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felony) and indecent exposure (a misdemeanor), but Lam probably
could not. At any rate, Judge Wright had an opportunity to establish
a new rule, or at least refine an existing one. If she erred, she erred
on the side of a narrow reading of the law.
C. Sexual Harassment and the Role of Power
Without doubt, Jones did not experience the kind of harassment
84
that women such as Mechelle Vinson, Kimberly Ellerth, Teresa
Harris,85 or Elizabeth Crisonino endured. There is, however, one
aspect of Jones’ case that does clearly distinguish her case from the
others: the power relationship between her and her harasser. This
approach points out that sexual harassment is not just about sex, but
about power.86 “If there is any common feature to the many factors
suggested as variables influencing [the occurrence] of sexual
harassment . . . , it is the factor of power or status. Whether formal or
informal, organizational or diffuse, real or perceived, status
differences between victims and offenders are the root of the
problem of sexual harassment.”87
Clinton clearly took advantage of, or at least benefited from, the
tremendous power differences between himself and Jones. As
Governor, Clinton had appointed her supervisor, suggested that he
had control over him, and intimated that he could thwart any
attempts that Jones might make to complain.88 As President, Clinton
had tremendous legal resources at his disposal. Beyond that, he had
the ability to shape media coverage of the case and public
perceptions of her claims as frivolous.89 Judge Wright did not address
84. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (describing how Vinson was
subjected to harassment by her supervisor for over four years, including numerous instances of
sexual assault).
85. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (reporting that Teresa Harris was
repeatedly insulted by the President of the company. Among other things, he called her a
“dumb ass woman,” asked her to fetch coins from his pants pocket, purposely dropped items on
the floor and asked her to pick them up, and suggested that they negotiate her raise at the
Holiday Inn.).
86. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
85-88 (1987) (recounting the social hierarchy of genders in which sexual harassment and power
are inextricably linked); MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 156-58 (describing the allocation of
power in the interest of men in sexual harassment).
87. McKinney & Maroules, supra note 41, at 42 (describing the central role of power
structures in sexual harassment cases).
88. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 664 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (recounting Clinton’s
reference to Dave Harrington as an inference of his power over her).
89. See generally SABATO & LICHTER, supra note 4. Much of the negative media attention
Jones received was generated by the White House and Clinton’s legal advisors. She was
portrayed stereotypically, based on her appearance, her region, her personal communication
style, and her choices about how to proceed with her claims, and as a result was discounted by
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the issue of the power differences between Jones and Clinton at all.
And to suggest that Judge Wright could have addressed this issue is
not far fetched.90 In the development of their own workplace
regulations, many employers for quite some time have specifically
recognized the role of power relationships in their sexual harassment
policies. For example, many universities and colleges strongly
discourage or even prohibit consensual relationships between faculty
and students because of the power differences between them.91
The Jones case particularly highlights the role of power in sexual
harassment, especially when Clinton’s alleged exposure of himself is
taken into account. The display of one’s genitals as a means of
intimidation and assertion of power has a long history.92 Consider a
few hypothetical cases involving a secretary, a nurse, an assistant
professor, or an associate at a law firm. Imagine that any of these
women finds herself alone with her superior—an executive, a doctor,
a tenured colleague, or a partner—who behaves as Clinton allegedly
did. Or imagine that the superior is not the woman’s boss, but her
boss’ superior, or someone else at the top of an institutional

most observers. Charles Craver, Professor of Labor and Employment Law at George
Washington University Law School, suggested that if this case “did not involve the President of
the United States, I think her chances would be very good. The White House has done a
masterful job of calling Paula Jones ‘trailer park trash.’” See Carrie Johnson et al., Does She Have
a Prayer?, 20 LEGAL TIMES 47, 47 (1998). This media coverage, without doubt, had an impact on
the progress of her lawsuit as an individual. Perhaps even more important, however, are the
broader social implications of the images of Jones as “trailer park trash.” They suggest that the
complaints of certain kinds of women, Anita Hill, for example, should be taken seriously, while
perhaps the complaints of others, such as Jones, are more suspect. Thus, an impression
emerges of professional women, whose sexual harassment charges are taken more seriously,
and non-professional women, who are given much less credibility. If this case is perceived as
allowing the harassment of non-professional women, this further magnifies work-place power
differentials, and is damaging indeed.
90. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan, 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the impact of
power differences by comparing student-on-student harassment to teacher-on-student
harassment and co-worker-on-co-worker harassment to supervisor-on-employee harassment).
91. See, e.g., BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS (2d ed. 1990) (describing the power relations involved in
teacher/student sexual relationships); Peter DeChiara, The Need for Universities to Have Rules on
Consensual Sexual Relationships Between Faculty Members and Students, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 137, 142 (1988) (recounting the more subtle coercion involved in a student-teacher
consensual relationship); Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 180 (1987) (describing the harm not
as nonconsensual acts but as the way we defined the self that consent to the non-coercive
relationships in which we engage). But see Sherry Young, Getting to Yes: The Case Against Banning
Consensual Relationships in Higher Education, 4 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 269, 269 (1996) (arguing
that policies prohibiting consensual sexual relationships between faculty and students belittle
adult women’s judgment and renders her incompetent to choose).
92. See W.H. LEWIS, THE SPLENDID CENTURY 46-47, 57 (1957) (describing such practices
during the Court of Louis XIV); see also DORIS KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM 241-42 (1976) (reporting that former President Johnson attempted to embarrass “one of
the delicate Kennedyites” by making the man join him in the bathroom).
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structure—the CEO, the hospital director, the university president, a
judge, or the governor of a state—and she is at the bottom. How is
this man’s behavior likely to affect this woman? At the very least, she
will be reluctant to be alone with him again, possibly to the detriment
of both her own career and the clientele she serves.
The
consequences might be far more serious than this. She might never
be comfortable in that work environment again. Sometimes a single
instance of intimidation is enough to poison a situation. For
example, Kathleen Carlin, a social worker and advocate for battered
women, tells a story about a man who beat his wife only once, the first
Thanksgiving they were together. For the rest of their marriage, all
he had to say to her was “remember Thanksgiving” to control her
behavior.93 Clinton’s alleged behavior, given his position of power,
was more than boorish and offensive. It was potentially devastating.
Clearly, there are some instances of boorish, offensive behavior
that, complained of and never repeated, do not create a hostile
environment. A joke, a personal remark, an inappropriate form of
address like “honey” or “babe,” an unwelcome dinner invitation, or a
pat on the shoulder constitute the type of social errors human beings
are prone to make with people they do not know. When they learn
quickly, as indicated by apologies and behavior changes, they should
not be vulnerable to lawsuits. Judge Wright’s conclusion, however,
that Clinton’s alleged behavior when he was alone with Jones in that
hotel room could not create a hostile work environment ignores the
principles of fairness, the purposes of sexual harassment law, and the
lessons of history.
D. The Issue of Summary Judgment
Finally, even putting aside Jones’ legal claims, Judge Wright’s use
94
of summary judgment to dismiss the case is also open to question.
Two weeks before Wright dismissed Jones’ case, in Gallagher v.
Delaney,95 a court of appeals judge from the Second District held that
summary judgment should not be used in sexual harassment cases
because federal judges may not be qualified to evaluate whether or
not specific conduct constitutes sexual harassment.96
93. See Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Kathleen Carlin, 57, Fought for Abused Wives, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1996, at 8.
94. See Cheryl Saban & Robert Stevenson, Courts Continue to Define Meanings of Sexual
Harassment, 219 N.Y. L.J., June 1, 1998, at 103, col. 3 (stating that the Jones decision may be
affected by recent decisions suggesting that district court judges may not be qualified to decide
on summary judgment whether conduct constitutes sexual harassment).
95. 139 F.3d 338 (1998).
96. Id. at 347.
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Carmel Gallagher was an executive secretary at Consolidated
Edison (“Con Ed”), who filed suit against her supervisor, Robert
Hansen, after enduring two years of what she felt was harassing
behavior.97 It began with him telling her “that he had a dream that
she kissed him.”98 For the next two years, he gave her cards and gifts,
which included plants, jewelry, and teddy bears, complemented her
on her appearance, gave her days off without charging her sick time,
and invited her to lunch and to go to Atlantic City with him, and told
her that she “brought out feelings in him that he had not had since
he was sixteen.”99 On one occasion when she went into his office,
there were boxes and paper stacked on the chairs, and he suggested
that “the only place for her to sit was on his lap.”100 When she
reported his behavior to her company’s EEOC officer and Hansen’s
supervisor, he changed his behavior towards her, acting rude and
staring at her.101 Gallagher conceded that “she accepted gifts,
compliments, and kisses” from other managers where she worked.102
Gallagher also admitted that Hansen “never directly asked [her] to
engage in sexual relations,” but he had “explicitly reminded her: he
was her boss, he wrote her performance reviews, he ‘had control over
[her] career.’”103 Con Ed’s EEOC officer also “confirmed that Hansen
had a romantic interest in her.”104
The Judge in this case overturned Con Ed’s motion for summary
judgement.105 The Judge argued that:
Creating a mosaic with the bits of pieces of available evidence, a
reasonable juror might picture either a malign employer using his
position to pressure a subordinate for sexual favors or a benign
boss trying – however ineptly – to express concern for his secretary
in a non-erotic manner that she mistakenly viewed as sexually
aggressive . . . . A jury made up of a cross-section of our
heterogenous communities provides the appropriate institution for
deciding whether borderline situations should be characterized as
106
sexual harassment . . . .

The opinion indicates that in sexual harassment cases, especially
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 341 (discussing Gallagher’s employment history).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 343-44.
Id. at 343.
See id. at 345 (describing how Gallagher’s supervisor’s behavior changed).
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 342 (delivering the decision of the court).
Id. at 342.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2001

17

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
PALMER.FINALMACRO_ASC VERSION 02

300

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

9/8/01 7:17 PM

[Vol. 9:2

those in which the allegations are not clear-cut instances of
harassment, the “dangers” of using summary judgment are
“particularly acute.”107 Gallagher’s account of the incidents she
experienced was considered a “borderline” case of sexual harassment,
deserving of a jury trial.108
There are some striking similarities between the Jones case and
Gallagher. When Gallagher resisted Hansen’s advances, he reminded
her of the control he had over her job.109 When Jones resisted
Clinton’s advances in the hotel room, he reminded her that her boss
was his good friend and they should keep what had happened
between themselves.110 Both women had the same interpretation of
these events: they had reason to believe their jobs and their
performance reviews would be adversely affected.111 There is,
however, a substantial difference between the two cases. Gallagher
admitted that Hansen “never directly asked [her] to engage in” any
kind of sexual relationship, and there is no evidence that Hansen
ever physically touched her.112 Jones alleged, however, that Clinton
attempted to kiss her, slid his hand up her thigh, exposed himself,
and asked her to kiss his erect penis.113 If Gallagher is a borderline
case, than Jones is arguably less borderline. In other words, under
Gallagher, Paula Jones would be entitled to her day in court.114
On the other hand, maybe Jones was lucky that her case was
dismissed. Perhaps one of the most disturbing aspects of the entire
episode was the defense that Clinton’s attorneys had prepared: the
use of Jones’ past sexual history in order to challenge the credibility
and validity of her claims.115 In an interview a year before Judge
107. Id. at 343.
108. See id. (explaining why Gallagher’s case should go to trial).
109. See id. at 344 (discussing why Gallagher believed the security of her job was dependent
upon her “accepting his gifts, offers, and signs of affection”).
110. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 664 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (explaining how Clinton
asked Jones to “keep this between ourselves”).
111. See Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 344; Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664.
112. Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 344.
113. See Jones, 990 F. Supp. at 664.
114. See Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 345 (explaining that “if a reasonable jury might evaluate the
evidence to find that material propositions of fact a plaintiff must prove, summary judgment
must be denied”).
115. See Jim Abrams, Clinton’s Lawyer Says He’s Ready to go to Trial in Jones Case, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 1, 1997, available at 1997 WL 4868748 (explaining the strategy Clinton’s lawyers
would use if the case goes to trial); see also Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and the Law: Do Rape
Shield Rules Matter?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 760 (1992) (analyzing the use of a victim’s past
sexual history in rape cases); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1174 (1986) (explaining
that not only does “the jury tend to be biased against the prosecution in a rape case, but that it
will go to great lengths to be lenient with the defendant when there are any suggestions of
‘contributory behavior’ on the part of the woman”). See generally CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND
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Wright dismissed Jones’ case, Robert Bennett, Clinton’s chief
counsel, stated that “he could get rough,” and would be willing to
make an issue of Jones’ sexual past.116 Documents released after the
dismissal indicated that if the case had gone to trial, Clinton’s legal
team wanted to use testimony from a man who “claimed he had sex
with Jones in his car in a bar parking lot on their first encounter,”
and that she had “initiated oral sex” with him during another
encounter.117 These alleged events occurred a few months before
Jones had met Clinton at the Excelsior Hotel. This man’s testimony
was considered relevant evidence by Clinton’s defense attorneys to
rebut Jones’ claims, to demonstrate that she was no “minister’s
daughter,” and to show that she could not be “emotionally
traumatized” by being asked to perform a sex act.118
In 1994, Congress proposed an amendment to Rule 412 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, commonly known as “the rape shield
rule,” to extend the prohibition of the use of a victim’s sexual history
from criminal sexual assault trials to civil trials, including sexual
harassment cases.119 The Supreme Court refused approval of this
amendment, arguing that it conflicted with Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.120 In April of 1994, Congress overruled the Court and
adopted the amendment.121 This new rule, however, is not a
categorical exclusion of a victim’s past sexual history. In sexual
harassment cases, exceptions can be made if the “probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party,” and “if [the incident] has been placed
in controversy by the alleged victim.”122 The decision to make
exceptions and allow the use of a victim’s past sexual history is at the
discretion of the judge.123
Jones’ past sexual behavior regarding the man in the parking lot
would presumably be banned under Rule 412, unless Clinton’s
POWER OF LAW 33 (1989) (explaining how a legal system has made a woman’s past sexual
activity relevant in rape cases, but not a man’s past sexual activity).

THE

116. See Abrams, supra note 115.
117. Judge Releases More Pages in Jones Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1998.
118. Id.
119. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee note (explaining that Rule 412 applies in both
civil and criminal proceedings).
120. See id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
121. See id. (explaining that “Rule 412 has been revised to diminish some of the confusion
engendered by the original rule and to expand the protection afforded alleged victims of sexual
misconduct”).
122. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
123. See FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(2) (explaining that “before admitting evidence under this rule
the court must conduct a hearing”).
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attorneys argued that this or any other incidents fell under the
exception. The decision to allow Jones’ past sexual behavior would
then be up to Judge Wright.124 The application of the amended Rule
412 and its exceptions has been inconsistent. Many practitioners are
still unaware of this Rule to begin with, but even in cases when the
Rule has been invoked, there are numerous examples in which a
victim’s past sexual behavior has been considered admissible
evidence.125 In fact, courts have consistently allowed at least the
partial admission of this kind of evidence in almost every application
of the Rule.126 Consequently, there is reason to believe that at least
part of Jones’ sexual past could have been allowed if the case went to
trial. But the fact that Clinton’s defense attorneys would consider
using this strategy is especially troubling given Clinton’s record for
supporting women’s rights issues during his administration.
Clinton’s first act as President was to sign the Family Medical Leave
Act.127 He also strongly supported the Violence Against Women Act,
which gave victims of sexual assault the right to sue in federal court.128
At any rate, although the dismissal of Jones’ case in and of itself is
questionable, given the strategy that Clinton’s lawyers were planning
on employing, perhaps Jones was better off settling before attempting
to appeal the dismissal and go to trial.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Both quid pro quo and hostile environment abuses are illegal, yet
they are still quite prevalent. Surveys of the private sector have
indicated that the proportion of women saying they have experienced
124. See FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1) (stating that evidence of past sexual behavior is
inadmissible if it is “offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior”);
FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(2) (stating that evidence of past sexual behavior is inadmissible if it is
“offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual predisposition”).
125. See Julie Springer et al., Survey of Selected Evidentiary Issues in Employment Law Litigation,
50 BAYLOR L. REV. 415, 416 (1998) (documenting instances where “defendants are . . .
aggressively using the sexual behavior and attitude of plaintiffs in and out of the workplace to
show that the plaintiff welcomed the allegedly offensive conduct”).
126. See Jennifer E. Smith, Fine Tuning the Wrong Balance: Why the New Rule 412 Does Not Go
Far Enough to End Harassment in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 63, 107
(1995) (explaining that defendants continue to “have the opportunity to pursue abusive
discovery and to admit irrelevant evidence concerning complainants’ sexual activities”). See
generally Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1655, 166474 (1995) (detailing the historical and current rulemaking procedures, including the
application of and amendments made to rules).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (stating that “a person . . . who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and other relief as a
court may deem appropriate”). But see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(holding that the civil remedy provision of the Act was unconstitutional).
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one or the other is well over fifty percent.129 In a 1994 survey of
federal government employees, forty-four percent of women
respondents reported that they had experienced some form of
unwanted sexual attention.130 Numerous studies have shown that
sexual harassment is quite prevalent in courtrooms, the very forum
that is supposed to provide women protection from harassment.131
Given the pervasiveness of sexual harassment, the pursuit of legal
action is certainly not the only factor that can contribute to positive
or negative changes in the workplace. Extensive media coverage of a
case like Jones’ can also effect public perceptions regarding what
constitutes appropriate workplace behavior and perceptions of
women who file claims.132 Court decisions in and of themselves,
however, do affect workplace cultures in important ways.133 Legal
doctrines establish precedent, but also the perception and
recognition by employers of the ground rules regarding sexual
harassment.134
In Jones v. Clinton,135 Judge Wright was given the opportunity to
further clarify those ground rules. Instead, this case has promoted
confusion in the law. Judge Wright ultimately concluded that Jones
129. See Riger, supra note 41, at 502 (discussing the prevalence of sexual harassment in the
workplace and noting that “unwanted sexual attention may be the single most widespread
occupational hazard in the workplace today”).
130. See BEN ERDREICH ET AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS,
PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES viii (1994).
131. See, e.g., Marina Angel, Sexual Harassment by Judges, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817, 817-18
(1991) (giving examples of and discussing “issues related to sexual harassment by judges”);
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Bibliographic Essay: Women in the Legal Profession, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER,
SOC. POL’Y & L. 149, 151 (1998/99) (discussing “the situation of women lawyers”). See generally
Sharon Grubin & John Walker, Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic
Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 11 (1997) (summarizing the findings of the task
force); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating the Judiciary About Gender Bias: The National Judicial
Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts and the New Jersey Supreme
Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 109 (1985); Minnesota Supreme
Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts: Final Report, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 827
(1989); First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, 9
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 129 (1986).
132. See, e.g., Steven Thomma & Elsa C. Arnett, Jones Case May Leave Mark on Harassment,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 5, 1998 (explaining that Clinton’s “court victory against a harassment
lawsuit could provide a legal road map to punishment-free behavior by perpetrators and have a
chilling effect on women filing complaints, many analysts, lawyers and academics believe. And
at the very least, it reopens a debate over what is proper sexual conduct between men and
women at work”); SABATO & LICHTER, supra note 4.
133. See Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that court
decisions “produce questionable legal definitions for the workplace where recognition of
employees’ dignity might require standards higher than those of the street”).
134. See id. (explaining that it is possible “through law to liberate the workplace from the
demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to implement the goals of human dignity
and economic equality in employment”).
135. 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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did not have a case sufficiently strong enough to bring before a
jury.136 This decision in and of itself appears to conflict with another
federal court decision regarding the use of summary judgment in
sexual harassment cases.137 In addition, there are problems with
Judge Wright’s analysis of both the quid pro quo and hostile work
environment claims, regardless of whether or not one agrees that
Jones’ claims did in fact constitute sexual harassment. Feminists
themselves disagreed on whether or not Jones’ claims constituted
sexual harassment,138 but what we have attempted to show in this
Article is that Judge Wright’s interpretation and application of sexual
harassment law was not the only line of reasoning available.
Moreover, much of Judge Wright’s opinion potentially conflicts with
existing precedent and is a step backwards in the development of
sexual harassment law. If nothing else, this case highlights the
difficulties women face in pursuing their sexual harassment claims,
and the ambiguities and contradictions that still exist in the law.

136. See id. at 679 (granting Clinton’s and Ferguson’s motions for summary judgment).
137. See Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 350.
138. See, e.g., Gwendolyn Mink, Misreading Sexual Harassment Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998,
at A17 (describing the different reactions women had to the Clinton sexual harassment scandal
while concluding that “we must affirm the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between
welcomeness and consent. Otherwise, no woman who unwillingly succumbs to her boss will
have any legal recourse”); David Savage & Alan Miller, Clinton Allegations Dividing Feminists,
Ideology: Kathleen E. Willey’s Account of a Sexual Encounter With the President Draws Far Different
Assessment by Women’s Rights Advocates, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at A13 (discussing how the
different reactions to “allegations that President Clinton groped a female volunteer . . . [reflect]
a fundamental struggle to determine what constitutes sexual harassment”); Gloria Steinem,
Feminists and the Clinton Question, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, § 4, at 15 (explaining that
regardless of whether “the allegations swirling around the White House turn out to be true . . .
feminists will still have been right to resist pressure by the right wing and the media to call for
his resignation or impeachment”); Wells, supra note 8, at 166 (recognizing that not all women
supported Clinton while “attempt[ing] to debunk the unfair attacks implying that those women
who do support President Clinton are unprincipled and irrational”).
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